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I. INTRODUCTION
The Nebraska Supreme Court established an important state elec-
toral redistricting precedent in Chambers v. Lautenbaugh.1 While po-
litical districts are generally redrawn following receipt by the state of
new federal census figures compiled once every ten years, the court's
treatment of state law in Chambers opens the door to more frequent
redistricting of political subdivisions in order to ensure population
numbers in those districts remain substantially equal between federal
censuses. This necessarily means that districts may be redrawn using
data that could be up to ten years old, depending on when a governing
board undertakes to redraw districts. The court itself heralded the
importance of its holding by ruling on what would otherwise have
been a moot case.2 Its reading of section 32-553 of the Nebraska Re-
vised Statutes in connection with the holding is applicable to public
officials who are responsible for redistricting political subdivisions. 3
Since the court's holding in Chambers could have wide-ranging appli-
cability, it is important that election commissioners and other public
officials responsible for redistricting in the state understand its
implications.
The issues in Chambers implicate a larger policy consideration of
balancing the need to maintain substantial population equality be-
tween electoral districts, and thus consistent voting power from one
voter to the next, and the practical concern for at least temporary sta-
bility in the electoral process. On the one hand is the concern about
1. 263 Neb. 920, 644 N.W.2d 540 (2002).
2. The court relied on the public interest exception in deciding to resolve the other-
wise moot case, as discussed infra. The public interest exception provides that:
[T]he court may choose to review an otherwise moot case under the pub-
lic interest exception if it involves a matter affecting the public interest
or when other rights or liabilities may be affected by its determination.
This exception requires a consideration of the public or private nature of
the question presented, the desirability of an authoritative adjudication
for future guidance of public officials, and the likelihood of future recur-
rence of the same or a similar problem.
Wilcox v. City of McCook, 262 Neb. 696, 700, 634 N.W.2d 486, 489 (2001).
3. "This issue, if adjudicated, would provide future guidance for public officials, in-
cluding members of the Omaha City Council who, as a result of the amendment
to section 14-201.03, are now responsible for redrawing city council district
boundaries. Furthermore, the similar question of whether section 32-553 limits
the Omaha City Council or other appropriate legal entities to redrawing district
boundaries only once every 10 years will likely arise prior to the federal decennial
census in 2010. For these reasons, we determine the public interest exception to
the mootness doctrine applies to this case." Id. at 927, 644 N.W.2d at 547.
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making the process fair, and on the other is the consideration that
voters generally relate to established boundaries and the officials rep-
resenting them. There is also the concern that frequent redistricting
can be used as a tool for partisan political gain by giving one group
more advantageous territory than another. The frequency of redis-
tricting, the age of population data used, and the proximity to an im-
pending election are the important considerations to be made when
undertaking this balancing.4
4. The recent experience of the Texas Legislature in redrawing that state's congres-
sional districts after Republicans took control of the Texas Legislature following
the 2002 elections has drawn national attention, mostly to the antics associated
with the process, but also to the frequency of redistricting, albeit of congressional
districts, and its political ramifications. While this note focuses on the frequency
of redrawing the districts of political subdivisions in Nebraska, an issue framed
by the Nebraska Supreme Court's decision in Chambers, it is important, given
the similar policy concerns, to acknowledge the related discussion about the fre-
quency of congressional redistricting and the extent to which it may be used as a
political tool that Texas' experience has more recently initiated. See, e.g., Edward
Walsh, Redrawing Districts Raises Questions: No Precedent Seen For GOP Ef-
forts, THE WASHINGTON POST, October 26, 2003, at A04.
In a similar vein, just as this note was going to press, the Colorado Supreme
Court issued an en banc decision, Salazar v. Davidson, 2003 WL 22833085 (Colo.
2003), holding that Colorado's congressional districts could be redrawn only once
- whether accomplished by the General Assembly, public initiative, or the
courts - following each federal decennial census. The disupte arose when the
Colorado General Assembly redrew the state's congressional districts at the end
of the 2003 legislative session, replacing districts drawn by a Colorado district
court when the legislature failed to do so in 2002. At issue was whether the Colo-
rado constitution allowed for more frequent redistricting than once after each fed-
eral census. Using for its conclusion guideposts strikingly similar to those this
note argues are important to the issues presented in Chambers, the court looked
to the wording of the state constitution in its current and pre-amended, original
form; the doctrine that when a timeframe is specified for redistricting, the impli-
cation is that it may not occur at other times; comparison to the state constitu-
tion's mandate for once-in-ten-years legislative redistricting; comparison to the
practice of both congressional and legislative redistricting in other states; custom
in Colorado; and significantly to matters of public policy. Again, the Colorado
Supreme Court's discussion involved congressional redistricting, but its discus-
sion of the policy concerns mirror those discussed in this note, and underscore
their importance regarding political representation by district in general. The
Colorado Supreme Court discussed the important policy consideration of stability
in electoral districts in the context of congressional districts, but the same consid-
erations for stability are equally applicable in Chambers which deals with the
districts of political subdivisions.
The framers [of the U.S. Constitution] knew that to achieve accountabil-
ity, there must be stability in representation.... [The ten-year interval
for redistricting] was short enough to achieve fair representation yet
long enough to provide some stability .... Limiting redistricting to once
every ten years maximizes stability .... If the districts were to change
at the whim of the state legislature, members of Congress could fre-
quently find their current constitutents voting in a diferent district in
subsequent elections .... Moreover, the time and effort that the consti-
tutents and the representative expend getting to know one another
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The interjection of courts into what is traditionally a purely politi-
cal process 5 means that the legal considerations will often be based on
a number of political ones, with the most important legal ramification
of Chambers being the power granted public officials responsible for
redistricting. The court was faced with determining the meaning of
the language of section 32-553, and held that the plain meaning of the
statute does not limit the frequency of redistricting but gives public
officials the (broad) power to ensure that the electoral districts of polit-
ical subdivisions maintain substantial population equality. A narrow
interpretation of the statute's language, which plausibly is owing of
two possible meanings, would have involved scanning a wider legal
landscape to place the language of the statute within a context that
provides considerable support for limiting the frequency of
redistricting.
Given policy interests in a stable electoral scheme, such as avoid-
ing voter confusion and political manipulation, the court should have
employed a narrow interpretation of the language of section 32-553.
Given the wider legal and policy context within which the question of
redistricting frequency arises, which includes the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in Reynolds v. Sims,6 other federal court decisions,
and the Nebraska Constitution, a narrow interpretation of section 32-
553 in Chambers would likely have been a better conclusion.
would be wasted if the districts continually change. "A boundary that is
continually moving is one that is unlikely to serve as any kind of imagi-
native focal point for communal identity..." and "redistricting thus flat-
tens identity within a jurisdiction by preventing subcommunities from
enjoying the kind of stability and sense of permanence that are neces-
sary ingredients for communal self-identification and, ultimately,
differentiation."
Salazar, 2003 WL 22833085, at *21-22 (quoting James A. Gardner, One Person,
One Vote and the Possibility of Political Community, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1237, 1242
(2002)). These and other policy considerations are discussed infra in Part IV.
But, cf Session v. Perry, 2004 WL 42591 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 6, 2004) (holding, in
connection with Texas legislature's redrawing of congressional districts in late
2003, that neither U.S. Constitution nor federal statute limit the frequency of
redrawing congressional districts to once per decade, though characterizing more
frequent redistricting as "grasps of power" and stating that "Congress can assist
by banning mid-decade redistricting...").
5. See, e.g., Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986) (discussing the history of the
Court's rationale toward considering political apportionment cases justiciable
where the issues presented are not merely political, but also involve important
constitutional questions).
6. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
[Vol. 82:575
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II. CASE PROGRESSION
A. Factual Background
In May 2000, Douglas County Election Commissioner Scott
Lautenbaugh announced plans to redraw the Omaha city council dis-
tricts in preparation for the primary and general elections in April and
May of 2001 using the 1990 federal census data, which was the only
census data available at that time.7 Even though the 2000 census had
just been completed, the data would not be available to Lautenbaugh
until around March of 2001, after the primary and just weeks before
the general election in May.8 Going into the 2001 election cycle,
Omaha's council districts had become considerably unequal in popula-
tion, which Commissioner Lautenbaugh attributed largely to city an-
nexations throughout the 1990s. 9 Even before the most recent
annexations in 1999, District One had a population of 50,351, District
Two had a population of 48,712, District Three had a population of
46,117, District Four had a population of 48,325, District Five had a
population of 53,179, and District Six had a population of 68,577.10 In
1999, a series of annexations added an additional estimated popula-
tion of 13,750, mainly to Districts Five and Six.11 Lautenbaugh high-
lighted the overall population disparity between the districts in an
editorial to the Omaha World-Herald, noting that after annexations
District Six had a population of 77,617 while District Three had a pop-
ulation of 45,117.12
Lautenbaugh's decision to redistrict was premised on his concern
that leaving the districts unchanged for the 2001 city council election
invited a lawsuit. The basis for such suit would be the "one-person,
one-vote" principle established by the landmark United States Su-
preme Court decision in Reynolds v. Sims.13 Reynolds primarily held
that the Equal Protection Clause requires both houses in bicameral
state legislatures be based on population distribution and not on geo-
graphical location. The general significance of Reynolds is that it
mandates the equality of voters' power through the drawing of elec-
tion districts. The Court stated, "[T]he Equal Protection Clause re-
quires that a State make an honest and good faith effort to construct
7. Rick Ruggles, Election Equality Pursued Political Aid Is Denied in Council Redis-
tricting Population by Council District, OMAHA WORLD HERALD, May 31, 2000, at
1.
8. Scott Lautenbaugh, Redistricting Still Necessary-Now, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD,
August 5, 2000, at 13.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Scott Lautenbaugh, Redistricting Still Necessary-Now, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD,
August 5, 2000, at 13.
13. 377 U.S. 533.
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districts, in both houses of its legislature, as nearly of equal popula-
tion as is practicable."14 The Court also made it clear in Board of Esti-
mate of City of New York v. Morris15 that the one-person, one-vote
standard applies not only to congressional and state legislative dis-
tricting, but also to that of local governments. "Both state and local
elections are subject to the general rule of population equality be-
tween electoral districts."16 The idea is that the votes of individuals
residing in a district with a population substantially larger than that
of similar districts of a governing board are, in essence, diluted when
compared to those of individuals in less populous districts.17 Accord-
ing to Lautenbaugh, the situation in Omaha in 2000 was ripe for a
suit based on Reynolds if redistricting did not occur before the 2001
city council elections.
While redistricting is a tool for the provision of an equal franchise,
it is also an effective tool of partisan politics.1S Few issues a legisla-
tive body takes up cause more political wrangling and subsequent
court challenges than redistricting.19 Redistricting decisions are com-
14. Id. at 577.
15. 489 U.S. 688 (1989).
16. Id. at 692-93.
17. Board of Estimate of New York, 489 U.S. at 462-63.
18. For example, see Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 753 (1973), where the court
stated:
"Politics and political considerations are inseparable from districting
and apportionment. The political profile of a State, its party registra-
tion, and voting records are available precinct by precinct, ward by ward.
These subdivisions may not be identical with census tracts, but, when
overlaid on a census map, it requires no special genius to recognize the
political consequences of drawing a district line along one street rather
than another. It is not only obvious, but absolutely unavoidable, that
the location and shape of districts may well determine the political com-
plexion of the area. District lines are rarely neutral phenomena. They
can well determine what district will be predominantly Democratic or
predominantly Republican, or make a close race likely. Redistricting
may pit incumbents against one another or make very difficult the elec-
tion of the most experienced legislator. The reality is that districting
inevitably has and is intended to have substantial political
consequences."
19. Andrew Gelman & Gary King, Enhancing Democracy Through Legislative Redis-
tricting, 88 Am. POL. Sci. REV. 541, 541 (1994). Gelman and King relate two ex-
traordinary accounts of the redistricting process in 1982. In Michigan, under
pressure from the Michigan Supreme Court, the legislature was battling over
Democratic and Republican plans. At one point, the Democrats gutted a com-
pletely irrelevant bill and replaced the body of it with their districting plan, but
left the non-conspicuous title of the old bill. When the Republicans found out, all
hell broke loose. During the midnight session, a Democratic senator collapsed,
but refused to leave the floor until he voted, even after paramedics arrived. A
Republican legislator pulled a time-delay tactic of requiring that the legal
description of all 148 districts be read into the record. Despite the ploy, the Dem-
ocratic legislator who had collapsed remained, voted, and the Democratic plan
passed. In Illinois, the legislature nearly erupted into an all-out brawl when a
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monly politically motivated, particularly when governing bodies have
the power to redistrict themselves. 20 Indeed, outright gerrymander-
ing, the practice of drawing often odd-looking political districts in or-
der to benefit one group over another in elections, has been a part of
American politics since at least 1812 when the practice got its name in
an election battle between Jeffersonians and the Federalists. 2 1 While
Lautenbaugh was not a member of the Omaha City Council, he was
harshly criticized and accused of blatant partisan political tinkering
for his decision to redistrict right before the 2001 city council election.
Republican senator, outraged by the parliamentary delaying tactics used by the
Democratic Senate president, charged the podium, but was stopped when sucker-
punched by another Democratic senator. Reapportionment gridlock ensued.
"From George Washington's first presidential veto to the present day, redistrict-
ing issues have been extremely controversial at every level of government. Most
redistrictings are contested in state and federal court cases heard so late that
there is insufficient time to follow the usual rules of discovery, evidence, or due
process. In total, legislative redistricting is one of the most conflictual forms of
regular politics in the United States short of violence."
Of course, the recent experience of the Texas Legislature in redrawing the
state's congressional districts once again highlighted in dramatic fashion the
often wild politics associated with redistricting. Following the 2002 state elec-
tions, Republicans took control of both houses of the Texas Legislature, and set
about passing a redistricting plan to replace districts instituted by a three-judge
federal court panel in late 2001. The court had acted when the Legislature failed
to pass a redistricting plan earlier in 2001. See HOUSE RESEARCH ORGANIZATION,
TEXAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, INTERIM NEWS, NEW DISTRICTS IN PLACE FOR
2002 ELECTIONS 1 (2002). Democrats decried what they saw as a political power
grab, influenced by national Republican Party leaders in Washington, D.C. Out-
numbered, Democrats in the Texas House resorted to the only power they as a
minority had left: deny the chamber a quorum necessary to consider the new
map. In what some described as a "Keystone Kops affair," over fifty Texas House
Democrats fled the chamber, and the entire state, taking refuge at a Holiday Inn
just across the state line in Ardmore, Oklahoma to avoid the jurisdiction of the
Texas state troopers "who had been ordered to round them up . .. ."
Speaker Tom Craddick, a Republican, locked the House chamber to pre-
vent further flight. Angry Republicans asked the state government to
help sniff out their colleagues. The state's Department of Public Safety
put out an alert asking for the public's assistance. A toll free number
was set up. The Texas Rangers gave chase .... In the state House,
legislators patched together milk cartons plastered with the faces of
missing Democrats .... Supporters [of the fleeing Democrats] stopped
by [the Holiday Inn in Ardmore] with fruit baskets.
David Barboza & Carl Hulse, Texas' Republicans Fume: Democrats Remain
AWOL, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2003, at A17. U.S. House Majority Leader Tom De-
Lay of Texas even encouraged the FBI to get involved to help the Texas state
troopers and Texas Rangers find the missing Democrats. Id.
20. Frank J. Macchiarola and Joseph G. Diaz, Minority Political Empowerment in
New York City: Beyond the Voting Rights Act, 108 POL. SCI. Q. 37, 42 (1993).
21. Mark E. Rush, Gerrymandering: Out of the Political Thicket and Into the Quag-
mire, 27 POL. SCI. AND POLITICS 682, 682 (1994) (discussing how, ironically,
though the Jeffersonian legislative majority attempted to oust a Federalist repre-
senting Boston's North Shore by drawing an aesthetically suspect district, the
Federalists held the district anyway).
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Some council members accused Lautenbaugh of political shenanigans
since both Lautenbaugh and then Omaha mayor Hal Daub were ac-
tive Republicans, and council members had been "none too kind" to
Daub.22 Lautenbaugh flatly denied any political motivation behind
his plan or any desire to gerrymander anyone off the council. 2 3
In early June 2000, State Senator Ernie Chambers, representing
Nebraska's Eleventh Legislative District (which includes much of
north Omaha and the area encompassed by Omaha city council Dis-
trict Two), threatened to bring suit to prevent Lautenbaugh from
redrawing the city council districts before the election, claiming
Lautenbaugh had no legal authority to do so. 2 4 Chambers' legislative
district boundaries coincided closely with those of city council District
Two, both of which were comprised primarily of minority popula-
tions.2 5 Previously, District Two had been drawn in 1990 to protect
its predominately black population's voting power.26 According to
Vickie Edwards, election commissioner at that time, this was pre-
mised on federal court rulings that had indicated that, when possible,
districts should be drawn such that blacks make up 65 to 75 percent of
a district where their populations predominate. 27 Chambers' main
concerns were that Lautenbaugh would not use federal census data in
redistricting, and that black representation on the city council would
be adversely affected through dilution of black voting power in District
Two.28 A showdown ensued, with Lautenbaugh arguing that redis-
tricting was needed to simplify the shapes of districts and have them
comply with the one-person, one-vote principle, and Chambers and
22. Rick Ruggles, Election Equality Pursued Political Aid Is Denied in Council Redis-
tricting Population by Council District, OMAHA WORLD HERALD, May 31, 2000, at
1 (discussing Councilman Marc Kraft's belief that Lautenbaugh intended to
"break up" the council in order to diminish Daub's political opposition); see also
Rick Ruggles, Council Seeks Meeting To Discuss Redistricting, OMAHA WORLD-
HERALD, June 1, 2000, at 1 (discussing Kraft's belief that Lautenbaugh's original
concept would essentially take one council seat from east Omaha, giving it to
west Omaha, and that he might have to run against fellow councilman Lormong
Lo, as they would be in the same district).
23. Rick Ruggles, Council Seeks Meeting To Discuss Redistricting, OMAHA WORLD-
HERALD, June 1, 2000, at 1.
24. Rick Ruggles, Chambers Challenges Redistricting Plan, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD,
June 3, 2000, at 1.
25. STATE OF NEBRASKA, LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT MAP FOR DISTRICT 11, at http://www.
unicam.state.ne.us/districts/leg-maps/districtll.pdf (last visited September 10,
2003); DOUGLAS COUNTY ELECTION COMMISSIONER, OMAHA CITY COUNCIL Dis-
TRICT 2, at http://www.444vote.net/districts/omahacc/omahacc.php?id=2 (last vis-
ited September 10, 2003).
26. Rick Ruggles, Election Equality Pursued Political Aid Is Denied in Council Redis-
tricting Population by Council District, OMAHA WORLD HERALD, May 31, 2000, at
1.
27. Id.
28. Rick Ruggles, Chambers Challenges Redistricting Plan, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD,
June 3, 2000, at 1.
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civil rights leaders resisting what they saw as a threat to black voting
power. 29
By the end of June 2000, Chambers claimed that Lautenbaugh had
to use 2000 census data, instead of 1990 census data, in redistricting
because state law requires district boundaries to be based on the most
recent census data.30 Though at the time the most recent data was
from the recently completed 2000 census, it would not be available
until around March of 2001, too late to draw districts in time for the
elections. 3 1 Thus, Lautenbaugh reiterated in an editorial that he had
to move ahead, albeit using census data that was ten years old, in
order to avoid being sued under the one-person, one-vote principle. 3 2
Lautenbaugh's fears of being sued became a reality in late August
when two Omaha businessmen filed suit to force him to redraw the
electoral districts before the upcoming election.3 3 Both businessmen
had their development proposals stall in the city council and were
looking for a change.34 Their suit alleged a violation of the one-per-
son, one-vote principle; one of the businessmen complained, "[redis-
tricting] should have been done five years ago."3 5
B. District Court Decision
On August 24, 2000, Chambers filed his suit in Douglas County
District Court asking for an injunction to stop Lautenbaugh from
redrawing the city council districts before the 2001 election. 36 Cham-
bers' petition first alleged Lautenbaugh exceeded his authority as
election commissioner by redrawing Omaha's city council districts for
the 2001 election using 1990 census data instead of waiting for 2000
census data.3 7 Second, the petition alleged Lautenbaugh exceeded his
authority by redrawing the districts later than six months after the
29. See Rick Ruggles, Proposal Debated Official: Intent Is to Preserve Predominantly
Black District, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, June 10, 2000, at 1 (discussing Reverend
Everett Reynolds', president of the local NAACP, vow to fight Lautenbaugh's re-
districting plan if it meant reducing black voting power in Omaha's District 2).
30. Rick Ruggles, Redistricting Timing Disputed State Sen. Ernie Chambers Says
any Revisions Must Wait for 2000 Census numbers, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, June
30, 2000, at 19.
31. Scott Lautenbaugh, Redistricting Still Necessary-Now, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD,
August 5, 2000, at 13.
32. Id.
33. Rick Ruggles, Suit Seeks New Districts, Now, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, August 26,
2000, at 16.
34. Rick Ruggles, Pair to Sue for New Districts, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, August 22,
2000, at 15.
35. Id.
36. Rick Ruggles, Suit Seeks To Postpone Redistricting Chambers says the election
commissioner must wait for numbers from the 2000 Census before redrawing the
City Council map, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, August 25, 2000, at 15.
37. Chambers v. Lautenbaugh, 263 Neb. 920, 922-23, 644 N.W.2d 540, 544 (2002).
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Legislature had reapportioned itself in 1991, which Chambers claimed
was the only time frame within which Omaha's city council districts
could have been redrawn under state law.38 Chambers' petition asked
the court to declare Lautenbaugh's redrawing of the districts unlawful
based on these two positions. 39 He also asked the court to declare the
expenditure of public funds in the redistricting process unlawful, and
to declare unlawful any election of the council using the new district
boundaries.40 After having unveiled the newly re-drawn districts,
Lautenbaugh demurred, alleging, inter alia, that Chambers had not
stated a sufficient cause of action.41
Lautenbaugh's decision to redistrict Omaha just ahead of the re-
lease of the 2000 census data and the subsequent routine decennial
redistricting of the Legislature and other political subdivisions was
based on section 14-201.03 of the Revised Nebraska Statutes (2000).42
That section provides "The election commissioner shall redraw the
boundaries of [the election districts of a city of the metropolitan class],
maintaining the compact and contiguous nature of each, when such
districts are no longer substantially equal in population pursuant to
section 32-553."43 Lautenbaugh's position was that he had an affirm-
ative duty based on this statute to redraw the Omaha districts be-
cause they were no longer substantially equal in population, in
addition to his concerns about the one-person, one-vote standard.44
Section 14-201.03 does not include any limiting language as to the fre-
quency of redistricting in order to maintain substantially equal popu-
lation within districts. It does, however, provide that districts shall be
redrawn "pursuant to section 32-553." 4 5
The Douglas County District Court followed section 14-201.03's
"pursuant to" signpost and arrived at having to determine the mean-
ing of section 32-553 of the Nebraska Revised Statutes (2000).46 The
38. Id.
39. Id. at 923, 644 N.W.2d at 544-45.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. The Nebraska statute reads:
The election commissioner in any county in which is situated a city of the
metropolitan class shall
divide the city into seven city council districts of compact and contiguous
territory. Such districts shall be numbered consecutively from one to
seven. One council member shall be elected from each such district. The
election commissioner shall redraw the boundaries of such districts,
maintaining the compact and contiguous nature of each, when such dis-
tricts are no longer substantially equal in population pursuant to section
32-553.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 14-201.03 (2000) (amended 2001).
43. Id.
44. 263 Neb. at 923-24, 644 N.W.2d at 545.
45. NEB. REV. STAT. § 14-201.03.46. Subsection (1) and (2) read:
[Vol. 82:575
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relevant portion of the statute provides that where a political subdivi-
sion elects its members by districts, which Omaha does,
such districts shall be substantially equal in population as determined by the
most recent federal decennial census. Any such political subdivision ... shall,
if necessary to maintain substantial population equality as required by this
subsection, have new district boundaries drawn within six months after the
passage and approval of the legislative bill providing for reestablishing legis-
lative districts. 4 7
Section 14-201.03 charges the election commissioner with redrawing
election districts when they are substantially unequal in population,
pursuant to section 32-553.48 The question for the district court was
whether the language of section 32-553 meant simply that redistrict-
ing was to be determined by the most recent federal decennial census
whenever it was done, in addition to the required redistricting within
six months after the Legislature redrew its own districts; or did it
mean that the most recent federal census was to be used in redistrict-
ing and that redistricting could only occur within six months after the
Legislature redrew its own districts.49 The district court did find it
(1) When any political subdivision except a public power district nominates or
elects members of
the governing board by districts, such districts shall be substantially
equal in population as determined by the most recent federal decennial
census. Any such political subdivision which has districts in place on the
date the census figures used in drawing district boundaries for the Leg-
islature are required to be submitted to the state by the United States
Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, shall, if necessary to
maintain substantial population equality as required by this subsection,
have new district boundaries drawn within six months after the passage
and approval of the legislative bill providing for reestablishing legisla-
tive districts. Any such political subdivision in existence on the date the
census figures used in drawing district boundaries for the Legislature
are required to be submitted to the state by the United States Depart-
ment of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, and which has not established
any district boundaries shall establish district boundaries pursuant to
this section within six months after such date. If the deadline for draw-
ing or redrawing district boundary lines imposed by this section is not
met, the procedures set forth in section 32-555 shall be followed.
(2) The governing board of each such political subdivision shall be re-
sponsible for drawing its own district boundaries and shall, as nearly as
possible, follow the precinct lines created by the election commissioner or
county clerk after each federal decennial census, except that the election
commissioner of any county in which a city of the metropolitan class is
located shall draw district boundaries for such city as required under
this section and section 14-201.03 and the election commissioner of any
county in which a Class IV or V school district is located shall draw dis-
trict boundaries for such school district as provided in this section and
section 32-552.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-553 (2002) (revised 2001).
47. Id.
48. NEB. REV. STAT. § 14-201.03.
49. 263 Neb. at 924, 644 N.W.2d. at 545.
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significant that neither section 14-201.02 nor section 32-553 contained
limiting language as to the frequency of redistricting:
Since there is no language limiting the redrawing of districts by the election
commissioner the Court further finds that the election commissioner can
redraw, if necessary, districts more than the one time required in the year
that the census figures are submitted to the State by the United States De-
partment of Commerce. 5
0
On January 17, the district court sustained Lautenbaugh's demur-
rer and dismissed Chambers' petition with prejudice, stating it could
not be amended to allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action
because Lautenbaugh had complied with the law.51 Chambers ap-
pealed to the Nebraska Supreme Court.
C. Nebraska Supreme Court Decision
The Nebraska Supreme Court issued its ruling in May 2002. By
this time, the primary and general elections for Omaha's city council
had already taken place under Lautenbaugh's new districts; Legisla-
tive Bill 71, which transferred authority for redistricting Omaha's
council districts from the Douglas County Election Commissioner to
the council itself, had been passed by the Legislature; and the council
had already scrapped Lautenbaugh's plan and drawn new districts for
Omaha.52 Lautenbaugh thus argued to the Supreme Court that
Chambers' appeal was moot since there were no longer any issues
"alive" to be determined. 5 3 However, the Supreme Court determined
that the question Chambers' petition raised concerning how often city
council districts may be redrawn was of sufficient public importance
that it would, pursuant to the public interest exception,54 issue a rul-
ing so as to provide guidance to, in particular, elected officials in prep-
aration for the 2010 census. 55
The Supreme Court's decision rested on a reading of section 32-553
similar to that of the district court, giving the statutory language "its
50. Id.
51. Id. at 922, 644 N.W.2d at 544.
52. Id. at 926, 644 N.W.2d at 546-47.
53. Id.
54. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
55. Id. at 927, 644 N.W.2d at 547. In applying the public interest exception in Cham-
bers, the court stated,
This court may choose to review an otherwise moot case under the public
interest exception if it involves a matter affecting the public interest or
when other rights or liabilities may be affected by its determination ...
Chambers' petition raises the public issue of how often city council dis-
trict boundaries may be redrawn pursuant to § 32-553. This issue, if ad-
judicated, would provide future guidance for public officials, including
members of the Omaha City Council who, as a result of the amendment
to § 14-201.03, are now responsible for redrawing city council district
boundaries. Furthermore, the similar question of whether § 32-553 lim-
its the Omaha City Council or other appropriate legal entities to redraw-
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plain and ordinary meaning."56 The Supreme Court first noted that
the statute requires political subdivisions to draw districts such that
they are "substantially equal in population as determined by the most
recent federal decennial census."57 The court found that the only time
frame mentioned in the statute for redistricting was the six-month pe-
riod following the passage of the legislative bill redistricting the state
on the basis of the federal decennial census. 58 The court took the lack
of specific language in the statute limiting more frequent redistricting
to mean that the six-month time-frame established only a minimum,
and not a sum-total, frequency for redistricting.59 Indeed, the court
stated, "there is no language in section 32-553 which prohibits the ap-
propriate legal entity from redrawing district boundaries at other
times to maintain substantial equality. We thus determine that sec-
tion 32-553 does not limit redrawing of district boundaries to only once
every 10 years.6o Thus, the court found that Lautenbaugh's actions
in redrawing the Omaha city council districts just before both the re-
lease of the 2000 census data and the council elections was in compli-
ance with the statute.6 1
III. ANALYSIS
A. Overview of Nebraska Case Law
1. Preliminary Look at Section 32-553 in State ex rel. Steinke v.
Lautenbaugh62
Chambers presented the Nebraska Supreme Court with the novel
question of how often electoral districts can be redrawn between cen-
suses, and involved the companion issue of how old the data used to
redraw districts can be. Such novelty is what prompted the court to
invoke the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine and es-
tablish a precedent for future guidance. As such, existing Nebraska
case law on the issue is of limited help, but it is important to survey
the most relevant cases to help build the context.
Just weeks before issuing its ruling in Chambers, the court issued
another ruling concerning both Lautenbaugh in his official capacity as
Douglas County Election Commissioner and section 32-553. In State
ing district boundaries only once every 10 years will likely arise prior to
the federal decennial census in 2010.
Id.
56. Id. at 931, 644 N.W.2d at 549-50.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. 263 Neb. 652, 642 N.W.2d 132 (2002).
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ex rel. Steinke v. Lautenbaugh,63 the court found that Lautenbaugh
had overstepped his statutory authority according to section 32-553
when he redrew the Omaha Public School District boundaries follow-
ing the 2000 census and switched the numbers on districts nine and
ten. After the districts were redrawn, the school board member who
represented district ten suddenly resided in district nine. So that dis-
trict ten could elect a new representative that resided in their district,
Lautenbaugh switched the numbers on the districts, since in election
year 2002 only odd numbered districts would hold elections. However,
this meant that John Langan, who represented what had been district
nine-now renumbered to district ten-would not stand for re-election
until 2004. Lautenbaugh said he made a judgment call to allow origi-
nal district ten to continue to be represented by one of its residents. 64
Langan, however, filed suit to prevent Lautenbaugh's renumbering so
that Langan could stand for re-election in 2002.
The case involved consideration of the meaning of section 32-553
prior to Chambers. The only hint the court gave concerning the issues
addressed in Chambers came when it declared:
Read together, §§ 32-552 and 32-553 authorize an election commissioner to
draw or adjust the boundaries of school districts following a federal decennial
census only as is necessary to maintain substantial population equality within
the districts . . .As noted, the applicable statutes authorize the election com-
missioner to adjust subdistrict boundaries to maintain substantial equality in
population... By adjusting the boundaries of what had been subdistricts Nos.
9 and 10 to reflect population changes reflected in the 2000 census data,
Lautenbaugh carried out his statutory authority. 6 5
Addressing the novel issue of the frequency of redistricting would wait
until the court's decision in Chambers.
2. Meaning of "Most Recent Census Data" Answered in Pelzer v.
Bellevue66
The Nebraska case that most parallels Chambers is Pelzer v. Belle-
vue.6 7 In 1975, the City of Bellevue passed an ordinance redrawing
the boundaries of the city's four wards.68 The annexation of several
areas, which added between 1,000 and 1,500 residents to the city,
prompted the redistricting.69 Plaintiff, a citizen of Bellevue, brought
suit in district court alleging that the new districts created by the or-
dinance were substantially unequal in population and thus violated
63. Id.
64. Id. at 655-56, 642 N.W.2d at 136-37.
65. Id. at 663-64, 642 N.W.2d at 141-42.
66. 198 Neb. 19, 251 N.W.2d 662 (1977).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 20, 251 N.W.2d at 663.
69. Id. at 21, 251 N.W.2d at 664.
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the one-person, one-vote standard of Reynolds.70 The controversy was
created when the city used numbers from three different sources to
derive the new districts. 7 1 The city had used portions of the 1970 fed-
eral census, the 1972 revision of the census, and a scheme created by a
city-appointed committee to arrive at Bellevue's population for redis-
tricting in 1975. Numbers from a special federal census in 1974 were
not used. 72
The Nebraska Supreme Court addressed the meaning of section 5-
10873 of the Nebraska Revised Statutes, the forerunner of the current
section 32-553, in light of "several compelling policy reasons to sup-
port [its] holding."74 Specifically, the court addressed the meaning of
the statute's direction to utilize "the most recent federal census" in
redistricting. The question with which the court was faced was
whether Bellevue was required to use the 1974 special federal decen-
nial census, given the statute's wording. The court found the legisla-
tive history of section 5-108 indicated a purpose to adhere to the one-
person, one-vote standard. 75 In a holding that would appear to sup-
port Lautenbaugh's contention that he was free to use 1990 census
data in redistricting Omaha in 2000, the Pelzer court ruled:
70. Id.
71. Id. at 22, 251 N.W.2d at 664.
72. Id.
73. Nebraska Revised Statutes section 5-108 was transferred to section 32-1057
which, after 1992, became section 32-553. Compare its language to section 32-
553 (note 46 supra), noting the nearly identical wording:
(1) When any city, village, county, or school district elects members of
any governing board by districts, such districts shall be substantially
equal in population as determined by the most recent federal decennial
census. Any such city, village, county, or school district which had dis-
tricts in place on the date the census figures used in drawing district
boundaries for the Legislature are required to be submitted to the state
by the United States Bureau of the Census shall, if necessary to main-
tain substantial population equality as required by this subsection, have
new district boundaries drawn within six months after such date. Any
such city, village, county, or school district in existence on the date the
census figures used in drawing district boundaries for the Legislature
are required to be submitted to the state by the United States Bureau of
the Census and which has not established any district boundaries shall
establish district boundaries pursuant to this section within six months
after such date. If the deadline for drawing or redrawing district bound-
ary lines imposed by this section is not met, the procedures set forth in
section 32-1059 shall be followed.
(2) The governing board of each political subdivision enumerated in this
section shall be responsible for drawing its own district boundaries, ex-
cept that the election commissioner of any county in which a city of the
metropolitan class is located shall draw district boundaries for such city
as required under this section.
74. 198 Neb. at 25, 251 N.W.2d at 665-66 (citing the reliability and objectivity of the
federal census as among the policy reasons for its holding).
75. Id. at 23-24, 251 N.W.2d at 665.
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[T]he substantial equality of political districts in the state must be ascer-
tained by using the most recent federal census... [Tihe language in section 5-
108, R.R.S. 1943, "the most recent federal census," refers to the most recent
federal census available to the particular locality... 76
The court cemented its holding further by declaring "[1ocal govern-
ments cannot disregard the most recent federal census when drawing
up political districts and use instead another method or basis for ap-
portionment, even though ostensibly rational."77
The similarity of Pelzer to Chambers is notable. Both cities were
redistricted due to population increases resulting from recent annexa-
tions. In both situations, the one-person, one-vote standard was a sig-
nificant factor. Both cases dealt with determining the meaning of the
same statute. In both situations it was disputed which census should
be used in redistricting. While the court in Chambers did not mention
Pelzer as support for such a doctrine, the court implied that use of ten-
year old census data was acceptable when it stated, "In his petition,
Chambers alleges .. .that Lautenbaugh 'drew such new districts by
using the 1990 decennial census data.' [W]e determine that
Lautenbaugh's actions in redrawing the district boundaries complied
with section 32-553."78 Instead, the court focused on the question of
the permissible frequency of redistricting and whether it must be lim-
ited to a six-month period following the Legislature's redistricting of
the state after the federal decennial census once every ten years. This
was a potentially precedent-setting question in Nebraska.
B. The Question of Frequency
The Nebraska Supreme Court in Chambers relied upon the statu-
tory language in determining that political subdivision redistricting
can be undertaken pursuant to section 32-553 more often than once
every ten years. It is instructive, however, to sample redistricting pre-
cedent and practices in other jurisdictions to analyze whether the de-
cision in Chambers sets Nebraska on a unique course, or whether it
brings it in line with other jurisdictions in the area of redistricting.
76. Id. at 25, 251 N.W.2d at 665-66. (emphasis supplied).
77. Id. Such a ruling would seem to preclude the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of
Reynolds in Garza, infra note 101, that since Reynolds permits redistricting be-
tween censuses, data obtained from sources other than a federal census could be
used. In Nebraska, Pelzer establishes that only federal census data may be used
in redistricting.
78. 263 Neb. at 931, 644 N.W.2d at 550. Interestingly, Lautenbaugh's brief to the
court, while arguing "[tihe Appellee complied with Neb. Rev. Stat. § 32-553 by
using the 1990 decennial census data which at the time of redistricting was the
most recent federal decennial census numbers available," did not make reference
to Pelzer, which provides direct support for the assertion. Nor did the Supreme
Court make any comparisons to Pelzer in its decision.
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Decennial redistricting of states and their political subdivisions fol-
lowing the federal census is the norm in the United States.79 Indeed,
the Supreme Court in Reynolds in essence established such a ten-year
cycle as the minimum frequency of redistricting which could stand
constitutional muster under the Equal Protection Clause.8 0 While
Chambers addresses the issue of how often is too often for redistrict-
ing, historically most of the legal trouble with redistricting frequency
has been governing bodies' reluctance to do it often enough. Reynolds,
for instance, was prompted by the Alabama legislature failing to reap-
portion itself for sixty years!8 1 In Colegrove v. Green,8 2 the United
States Supreme Court was asked to force the Illinois State Legislature
to redraw congressional districts after it had failed to do so for over 40
years.8 3 Likewise, by the early 1960's and the Supreme Court's period
of reapportionment cases, Tennessee's legislature had not redistricted
for over 60 years,8 4 Georgia for over 30 years,8 5 and Delaware since
1897.86 Other states, including South Dakota, Maryland, California,
Texas, and Florida also had developed large discrepancies in voter dis-
tricts through failure to redistrict.8 7 The reluctance to redistrict was
attributed to rural-dominated legislatures refusing to cede power to
increasingly populous urban areas, resulting in a small fraction of a
state's population electing a majority of the state's legislature.8 8
79. Ramos v. Illinois, 781 F. Supp. 1353 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (quoting Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533 (1964) ("Decennial reapportionment appears to be a rational ap-
proach to readjustment of legislative representation in order to take into account
population shifts and growth. Reallocation of legislative seats every 10 years co-
incides with the prescribed practice in 41 of the States.")).
80. 377 U.S. at 583-84 (holding that while it was not setting an express minimum for
redistricting to be every ten years, redistricting less frequently than that "would
assuredly be constitutionally suspect"); see also Garza v. County of Los Angeles,
918 F.2d 763, 772 (9th Cir. 1990).
81. Id. at 540.
82. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
83. Colegrove became an important case not for what it did, but for establishing what
the Supreme Court would not do. Colegrove set the precedent that reapportion-
ment issues were inherently political, and thus without the purview ofjusticiable
controversies. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), reversed Colegrove and estab-
lished that apportionment disputes were justiciable under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See also note 5 supra.
84. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 191 (1962).
85. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 6 (1964).
86. See Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964).
87. HOWARD D. NEIGHBOR, CITY COUNCIL DISTRICTING IN THE 1980's 16 (1980).
88. Id. "[In 1961], 10.7 percent of the California population could elect a majority of
the state senate. In Florida, at the same time, 12 percent of the population could
elect a majority in both the senate and house of representatives. The worst in
that respect was Nevada ... where 8 percent of the population could elect a ma-
jority of the legislative body." But see FRANK M. BRYAN, POLITICS IN THE RURAL
STATES: PEOPLE, PARTIES, AND PROCESSES 196 (1981) (making the case that a
number of studies began to show in the 1960's and 70's that rural domination of
legislatures was not a significant cause of urban problems not being addressed:
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C. One-Person, One-Vote Standard: Reynolds v. Sims
Equal protection challenges to apportionment schemes are based
at least foundationally on the United States Supreme Court's
landmark decision in Reynolds v. Sims,8 9 which ultimately forced sev-
eral states to redesign how the two houses in their legislatures were
elected. The one-person, one-vote standard that came out of the case,
and which Lautenbaugh was reportedly concerned about in Omaha,
stated that for state election districts to pass muster under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, they must be sub-
stantially equal in population. 90 In Reynolds the issue was whether
states could constitutionally base districts for the state's House of
Representatives on population while basing the state's Senate on geo-
graphical subdivisions, such as counties. The Court, in holding that
both houses must be based on population, stated "[an individual's
right to vote for state legislators is unconstitutionally impaired when
its weight is in a substantial fashion diluted when compared with
votes of citizens living in other parts of the State."9 1
After having held that electoral districts must be substantially
equal in population, the Court went on to temper some of the implica-
tions of the decision. First, the Court said a state must make "an hon-
est and good faith effort to construct districts .. .as nearly of equal
populations as is practicable. Mathematical exactness or precision is
hardly a workable constitutional requirement."9 2 Second, the Court
recognized that imbalance in districts just before a census would be an
inevitable result of decennial apportionment, but that
[1l imitations on the frequency of reapportionment are justified by the need for
stability and continuity in the organization of the legislative system .. .In
substance, we do not regard the Equal Protection Clause as requiring daily,
monthly, annual or biennial reapportionment, so long as a State has a reason-
ably conceived plan for periodic readjustment of legislative representation. 9 3
Third, the Court stated that it did not intend to establish decennial
reapportionment as the constitutional standard, but that "compliance
with such an approach would clearly meet the minimal requirements
for maintaining a reasonably current scheme of legislative representa-
tion" and "if reapportionment were accomplished with less frequency,
it would assuredly be constitutionally suspect."94 Fourth, the Court
"By 1970 the reapportionment bubble had truly burst.., the charge against rural
America - and it was precisely that - was for the most part a bum rap. In short,
rural America had been convicted without a trial and with only the skimpiest
circumstantial evidence.").
89. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
90. Id. at 568.
91. Id. at 568.
92. Id. at 577.
93. Id. at 583.
94. Id. at 583-84.
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did not state that more frequent reapportionment "would not be con-
stitutionally permissible or practicably desirable." 9 5 Finally, the
Court cautioned that the proximity of elections and the burden to an
already engaged electoral process might militate against changing dis-
tricts "mid-stream."
[U]nder certain circumstances, such as where an impending election is immi-
nent and a State's election machinery is already in progress, equitable consid-
erations might justify a court in withholding the granting of immediately
effective relief in a legislative apportionment case, even though the existing
apportionment scheme was found invalid. In awarding or withholding imme-
diate relief, a court is entitled to and should consider the proximity of a forth-
coming election and the mechanics and complexities of state election laws,
and should act and rely upon general equitable principles. With respect to the
timing of relief, a court can reasonably endeavor to avoid a disruption of the
election process which might result from requiring precipitate changes that
could make unreasonable or embarrassing demands on a State in adjusting to
the requirement of the court's decree.
9 6
D. Federal Courts and the Frequency Question
Against this backdrop are set most of the precedent from other ju-
risdictions and the federal courts with regards to the frequency, tim-
ing, and age of data used in redistricting. Most courts deciding
reapportionment cases where the closeness of an election to a census
has made the timing of redistricting an issue have held that the inter-
ests of one-person, one vote should usually yield to interests of predict-
able reapportionment and election stability. That is, even though the
result may be that malapportioned districts are used for an election on
the cusp of the release of new census data, the instability of more fre-
quent redistricting or the upheaval of holding new elections based on
new districts once new data is at last available are often more onerous
than temporary non-compliance with the one-person, one-vote stan-
dard. Courts have generally recognized it is inevitable that near the
end of a ten-year census cycle, or due to changes in a mobile popula-
tion, districts will become malapportioned. Yet, it does not follow that
more frequent redistricting in pursuit of the one-person, one-vote prin-
ciple should be undertaken.
Taken together, prominent apportionment cases provide some gen-
eral guidelines. Where there is no evidence of a legislative body refus-
ing to redistrict yet finds itself facing an election "on the cusp of [a]
decennial census,"97 courts have generally been less apt to require ei-
ther a redistricting before the election, or throwing out election results
based on an old census and holding special elections, finding it more
95. Id. at 584.
96. Id. at 585.
97. French v. Boner, 786 F. Supp. 1328 (M.D. Tenn. 1992), affd, 963 F. 2d 890, 891-
92 (6th Cir. 1992).
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important to preserve district stability.98 Courts have held that popu-
lation shifts alone at the end of a ten-year census cycle do not create
such an actionable claim.99 In addition to preserving district stability,
courts have found redistricting between censuses to be inherently in-
accurate anyway, given that the data relied upon is necessarily from
the last census, which may have been some years previous.10 0 How-
ever, where a state fails to redistrict because of political squabbling
and not due to any rational state policy, or where an existing district-
ing scheme is found to be discriminatory, courts have been willing to
step in and order an immediate redistricting even when the result will
be delay of upcoming elections or using data other than census data to
form new districts.' 0 '
98. Id. at 892 ("We do not believe that considerations of mathematical equality in
representation or the presumption in favor of redistricting every ten years out-
weigh the considerations outlined above concerning the validity of four-year
terms, the settled expectations of voters and elected officials, the costs of the elec-
tions, and the need for stability and continuity of office.") See also Fairley v. For-
rest County, 814 F. Supp. 1327 (S.D. Miss. 1993) (holding that county did not
have to hold new elections since 1) population deviations can occur at any time
but do not necessarily require redistricting, and 2) the county had done every-
thing it could to redraw districts for 1991 elections using 1990 data, but district-
ing plan approved too late by Justice Department); Political Action Conference v.
Daley, 976 F. 2d 335 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding Chicago's 1991 city council elections
valid where they were based on 1980 census data and 1990 data did not become
available until two weeks before election); Cardona v. Oakland Unified School
District, 785 F. Supp. 837 (1992) (holding that where a verification of census data
could require redistricting again shortly after usual decennial redistricting, City
of Oakland could delay redistricting until 1993 and hold elections in the interim
based on 1980 data); Wesch v Folsom, 6 F.3d 1465 (11th Cir. 1993) ("The Su-
preme Court has made it clear that the policy interest of promoting stability in
elections dictates against redistricting too frequently . . . [Clourts are reluctant
to redistrict shortly before a new census, which might require yet another
reapportionment.").
99. Fairley v Forrest County, 814 F. Supp. 1327 (S.D. Miss. 1993).
100. See Simkins v. Gressette, 495 F. Supp. 1075 (D.S.C. 1980) (holding that 1980
elections would not be halted until new districts drawn using 1980 data, nor
would districts be redrawn using 1970 data given 10-year age of data); White v.
Daniels, 909 F.2d 99 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that districts claimed to dilute black
voting strength under Voting Rights Act of 1965 would not be redrawn just before
1991 elections since elections would be disrupted and because redrawing districts
would have to use 1980 data given that 1990 data was not yet available).
101. See Farnum v. Burns, 548 F. Supp. 769 (D.R.I. 1982) (holding that because the
delay in redistricting before state senatorial elections was due to a struggle be-
tween the legislature and governor and not due to a rational state policy, court
enjoined 1982 elections until new districts were drawn); Garza v. County of Los
Angeles, 918 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that where it was proven existing
districting plan was the product of a discriminatory scheme and part of a continu-
ing pattern of such through several decades, county had to redistrict in 1988 in
preparation for 1990 elections and that any data gathered since 1980 census, or
even reliable predictive data, could be used).
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E. Nebraska Constitutional Guidance
Issues of redistricting in Nebraska have often focused on redistrict-
ing the Legislature.10 2 Article III, section 5 of the Nebraska Constitu-
tion provides the guidelines for Legislative redistricting,10 3 but is also
instructive as to the history, tradition, and intent of political redis-
tricting in general, including that of political subdivisions, in the
state. Indeed, the language of section 32-553 closely ties redistricting
of political subdivisions in the state to the time-frame within which
the Legislature is redistricted.104 It is useful to examine what the Ne-
braska Constitution says about the frequency of redistricting to fur-
ther provide policy context for the operation of section 32-553. With
regard to the frequency of legislative redistricting, the Nebraska Con-
stitution states simply, "The Legislature shall redistrict the state after
each federal decennial census."10 5 The language does not limit legis-
lative apportionment to just once every ten years, that being after the
federal census. It was not always so, however.
The pertinent part of Article III, section 5, up until 1966, used to
read, "The Legislature may re-district the state from time to time, not
more often than once in ten years."1o6 Legislative Bill 923, passed in
1965, submitted a proposed constitutional amendment to the people of
Nebraska that changed the word "may" to "shall," replaced the lan-
guage of "from time to time" with "after each federal decennial cen-
sus," and dropped the phrase "not more often than once in ten years."
Thus, until the amendment passed in 1966, at least the Legislature
was constitutionally barred from redrawing its electoral districts more
than once every ten years.
In 1965, the committee and floor debate on LB 923 focused mostly
on other parts of the bill that would provide for continuance of an
102. See, e.g., Hlava v Nelson, 247 Neb. 482, 528 N.W.2d 306 (1995); Dendinger v.
Nelson, 247 Neb. 487, 528 N.W.2d 309 (1995); Day v Nelson, 240 Neb. 997, 485
N.W.2d 583 (1992); Carpenter v State, 179 Neb. 628, 139 N.W.2d 541 (1966).
103. The Nebraska Constitution states:
The Legislature shall by law determine the number of members to be
elected and divide the state into legislative districts. In the creation of
such districts, any county that contains population sufficient to entitle it
to two or more members of the Legislature shall be divided into separate
and distinct legislative districts, as nearly equal in population as may be
and composed of contiguous and compact territory. One member of the
Legislature shall be elected from each such district. The basis of appor-
tionment shall be the population excluding aliens, as shown by the next
preceding federal census. The Legislature shall redistrict the state after
each federal decennial census. In any such redistricting, county lines
shall be followed whenever practicable, but other established lines may
be followed at the discretion of the Legislature.
NE. CONST. art. III, § 5.
104. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 14-201.3
105. Id.
106. NE. CONST. of 1922 art III, § 5 (1965) (emphasis supplied).
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elected legislator after redistricting when their district boundaries
changed and whether county lines should be crossed in forming dis-
tricts.1 o7 Senator George Syas made one of the brief comments con-
cerning the frequency-of-redistricting language, but focused on the
replacement of "may" with "shall," stating that given recent federal
cases, the Legislature could no longer reapportion at will and must do
it at least once every ten years. Again, the overall concern was not
with the Legislature redistricting too often, but rather not often
enough. Senator Elvin Adamson, in rebuttal, argued that the "may"
language should be left since "it would seem rather ridiculous that you
would be required to reapportion when it would make only minor
change[s]" in situations where there were no population shifts beyond
"proper tolerance[s]."18 Senator Syas argued that court precedent
would be enough to ensure the Legislature redistricted at least once
every ten years.
Only Senator Jerome Warner directly addressed the "not more
often than once in ten years" language when he argued, in support of
LB 923, that given recent federal court cases and the fact that the
Legislature was enacting a new apportionment plan in 1965,109 such
limiting language had to be removed "or else you will be in another
problem in [the] 1971 session following the census at that time."11o
Thus, it appears the removal of the language in Article III, section 5
restricting redistricting to once every ten years was removed only so
that the Legislature could redistrict following the 1970 census and
then every 10 years thereafter. This would set the Legislature on its
usual ten-year reapportionment schedule and avoid a potential one-
person, one-vote lawsuit in 1971.111 It is clear from the floor debate
over LB 923 that senators were not contemplating removal of the lim-
iting language in order to regularly allow for redistricting more often
than once every ten years.' 1 2
107. Hearing on LB 923 Before the Committee on Government and Military Affairs,
July 20, 1965; Floor Debate on LB 923, 75th Legislature, July 26, 1965.
108. Hearing on LB 923 Before the Committee on Government and Military Affairs,
July 20, 1965, 11-12; see also Floor Debate on LB 923, 75th Legislature, July 26,
1965, 2922-A (where Sen. Syas later supports the change from "may" to "shall").
109. Three previous bills, two passed in 1963 and one earlier in 1965, had been de-
clared unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the United States
Constitution. See Carpenter v. State, 179 Neb. 628, 139 N.W.2d 541 (1966).
110. Floor Debate on LB 923, 75th Legislature, July 26, 1965, 2923-A.
111. Id.
112. A Nebraska Attorney General's Opinion in 2002 came to an opposite conclusion,
but does so by concluding without explanation that "a reasonable inference is
that the removal from the Constitution of the express limitation on redistricting
frequency was a response to recent experience and was intended to remove the
frequency limitation." The opinion, while mentioning the recent trouble the Leg-
islature was having getting a reapportionment bill passed that would satisfy the
courts, interprets instead the provision to remove the frequency limitation as a
core component of the constitutional amendment, as opposed to a necessary mea-
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Further guidance for the meaning of the constitutional provision
comes from a neighboring jurisdiction. In 2000, in the case of Emery v.
Hunt (In re Certification of a Question of Law),113 South Dakota's Su-
preme Court analyzed a very similar provision in their state constitu-
tion, coincidentally also enumerated Article III, section 5, in a
certification from the U.S. District Court for the District of South Da-
kota. Two members of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe who were re-
sidents of Legislative District 28, which was specially divided into two
smaller districts such that minority interests would be protected,
brought suit in federal court. In 1996, the South Dakota Legislature
had decided to do away with the special design of District 28, prompt-
ing the suit. At issue was whether the legislative bill eliminating the
division of District 28 was in essence a reapportionment bill, and
whether the South Dakota Constitution prohibited such reapportion-
ment in the middle of a decennial census cycle.
South Dakota's constitution mandates that the legislature will re-
apportion the state in 1991 and every ten years thereafter,114 and un-
til 1982 it also contained the phrase "but at no other time." Thus, it
was very similar to Nebraska's constitutional provision that reappor-
tionment take place "not more often than once in ten years," which
survived until 1966. The South Dakota Supreme Court held that the
1996 bill was in essence a reapportionment bill, so the only question
remaining was whether such a bill could be passed since it had been
only five years since the last reapportionment. A 1982 amendment to
sure only to resolve the current reapportionment problem, despite Sen. Warner's
floor debate that would indicate just that. Further, the opinion cites authority
from other jurisdictions, nearly. all of which indicate a limit on the frequency of
redistricting in their state constitutions, but the opinion endeavors to distinguish
those cases or cite differences in the language of Nebraska's provision that seem
to make a difference. Most importantly, the opinion, in citing decisions from
other jurisdictions, neglects to mention the 2000 decision of the South Dakota
Supreme Court which came to a very different conclusion on the identical ques-
tion under nearly identical circumstances. See Op. Att'y Gen. Neb. AG LEXIS 3
(2002).
113. 615 N.W.2d 590 (2000).
114. S.D. CONST. art. III, § 5 states:
The Legislature shall apportion its membership by dividing the state
into as many single-member, legislative districts as there are state sena-
tors. House districts shall be established wholly within senatorial dis-
tricts and shall be either single-member or dual-member districts as the
Legislature shall determine. Legislative districts shall consist of com-
pact, contiguous territory and shall have population as nearly equal as is
practicable, based on the last preceding federal census. An apportion-
ment shall be made by the Legislature in 1983 and in 1991, and every
ten years after 1991. Such apportionment shall be accomplished by De-
cember first of the year in which the apportionment is required. If any
Legislature whose duty it is to make an apportionment shall fail to make
the same as herein provided, it shall be the duty of the Supreme Court
within ninety days to make such apportionment.,
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the South Dakota Constitution had removed the language "but at no
other time," and the State was arguing that the Legislature was thus
free to pass a reapportionment bill in 1996 since the limiting language
had been removed. In crafting its answer, the South Dakota Supreme
Court looked to one of its own 1933 decisions, Opinion of the Judges.
Re Legislative Reapportionment,115 in which the court had compared
the state's constitutional provision for redistricting with other states'
at the time in determining whether the 1933 Legislature could redis-
trict where the 1931 Legislature had failed to do so. At that time, the
"but at no other time" language was still part of the South Dakota
Constitution.
This question seems not particularly difficult, and all the cases we have dis-
covered relevant thereto appear to point in one direction. The Constitutions of
many of the states contain provisions very similar to our own with reference to
the matter of apportionment. In most of them, however (in fact, in all which
we have examined excepting those of Arkansas and Nebraska), we fail to find
the words "but at no other time." That is to say, in most of the comparable
constitutional provisions there is an affirmative mandate for action at a cer-
tain specified time but no express prohibition of action at other times. We do
not, however, regard that fact as particularly material. It seems to be held by
all the courts which have had occasion to pass upon the matter that an affirm-
ative mandate for legislative action at a specific time is an implied prohibition
of action at any other time ... In other words, when a Legislature once makes
an apportionment following an enumeration no Legislature can make another
until after the next enumeration .... 116
In Opinion, the question of whether the Legislature could redistrict
more than once every ten years was, as the court admitted, relatively
easy to determine based on the language expressly prohibiting
such."17 But by the time the court heard Emery, the limiting lan-
guage was gone. However, the court relied upon the implied duty
principle outlined in Opinion and another South Dakota precedent,
Kane v Kundert,1 18 when it held that even in the absence of the limit-
ing language, the South Dakota Legislature was confined to redistrict
the state only once every ten years:
As in Opinion, we determined in Kane that even without the express prohibi-
tion, the affirmative mandate for legislative action precludes action at any
other time. The constitutional provision, as amended [in 1982], reads, in part,
that "an apportionment shall be made by the Legislature in 1983 and in 1991,
and every ten years after 1991." This language is mandatory and does not
contemplate that the Legislature will fail to make an apportionment every ten
115. 246 N.W. 295 (S.D. 1933).
116. Id. at 296.
117. In Opinion, however, the court allowed the 1933 Legislature to redraw South
Dakota's districts even though it ran counter to the constitutional mandate to do
so in 1931 and then not again for another ten years, because the 1931 Legislature
had failed to do so. "[S]uch prohibition [against redistricting] is conditioned upon
the prior performance of the affirmative duty and does not come into operation
until the duty mandatorily imposed has been exercised." Id. at 296-97.
118. 371 N.W.2d 172 (S.D. 1985).
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years after 1991, nor does it provide, as interpreted in Opinion, and reinforced
in Kane, for an apportionment to be made at any other time after that duty
has been discharged. The Sixty-sixth Legislature, sitting in 1991, apportioned
its membership by enacting SDCL 2-2-28. There is no constitutional author-
ity for another legislative apportionment until 2001 ... The affirmative con-
stitutional mandate for legislative action at a specified time remains in the
present version of Article III, Section 5, thereby providing an implied prohibi-
tion of action at any other time. 1 1 9
The Nebraska and South Dakota constitutional provisions are very
similar, and both have a similar history in that language limiting the
frequency of redistricting to once every ten years was at one time in-
cluded, then removed through amendment. The Nebraska Constitu-
tion's affirmative statement that "[t]he Legislature shall redistrict the
state after each federal decennial census," implies that redistricting is
to be done once every ten years, shortly after each federal decennial
census. While that doesn't positively determine the question of how
often districts may be redrawn, the court could have looked to the his-
tory of Article III, section 5 for guidance from a constitutional context
and compared it to the approach taken by a neighboring jurisdiction,
the South Dakota court's decision in Emery.
In looking to the history of Article III, section 5 of the Nebraska
Constitution, the court may well have found the fact that the limiting
language was amended out of the provision to weigh in favor of their
decision that section 32-553 does not limit the frequency of redistrict-
ing. However, as discussed above, floor debate in the Legislature on
LB 923, which contained the amendment, indicates the restriction
was removed simply to assist in passing a redistricting plan in 1965
and to avoid a potential redistricting problem in 1971. It was not in-
dicative of a legislative or popular desire to authorize redistricting
more frequent than once every ten years. Additionally, the South Da-
kota Supreme Court's decision interpreting a very similar constitu-
tional provision would have been instructive, holding, first, the
removal of limiting language did not mean more frequent redistricting
was now constitutional and second, an affirmative grant of power to be
used at a specific time is an implied prohibition of its use at another
time. Given these sources of additional context, the court could have
interpreted section 32-553 against a broader constitutional backdrop,
and would have had before it persuasive evidence that perhaps redis-
tricting, be it of the Legislature or political bodies below it, is to be
done not more than once every ten years.
F. Other Statutory Guides: Redistricting Due to Annexation
In determining the meaning of section 32-553, it is worth noting
Nebraska Revised Statutes section 19-3052. This statute does what
119. 615 N.W.2d at 595, 596.
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would have likely avoided Chambers all together: it spells out exactly
when, how, and who is to redistrict a municipality following the an-
nexation of territory to the municipality. From the outset, it is to be
noted that section 19-3052 applies only to cities of the first class, cities
of the second class, and villages which elect members of their gov-
erning boards by districts. 120 Omaha is considered a city of the metro-
politan class and thus does not fall under the provisions of section 19-
3052. Yet, at least some comparison can be made between 32-553 and
19-3052 since the latter seems to address each of the issues in
Chambers.
Section 19-3052 (1) provides that whenever a municipality annexes
territory to itself and such annexation causes election districts to be-
come substantially unequal in population, the city is to redraw the
districts within 180 days after the annexation.121 The districts are to
be redrawn such that they have substantially equal population. Such
redistricting is to be done using "the most recent federal decennial
census." 12 2 Paragraphs (3) and (4) of the statute provide that if an-
nexations would require the redrawing of districts such that they
would not be complete at least 80 days prior to the primary elections,
the annexations are not to take place until after the elections. It also
provides that such district-altering annexations cannot occur between
primary and general elections. 12 3 The rest of the statute states that
annexations that do not create substantial population inequalities
need not trigger redistricting at all. The acceptable range of popula-
tion deviation is set at ten percent or less of the mean population of
each district. 12 4
Lautenbaugh's major contention was that Omaha's city council dis-
tricts had to be redrawn prior to the 2001 city council elections be-
cause annexations throughout the 1990s had caused large disparities
in population between election districts. If the spirit of section 19-
3052 is applied, such would be a mandatory reason for redistricting,
and it would have to be done, if deviation from the mean population
were greater than 10 percent, within 180 days after the annexation
and completed at least 80 days before any primary election. And yes,
the most recent federal census data would be used. According to Pel-
zer,12 5 that would mean the most recent federal census data available
at the time, in which case it would have been the 1990 census data in
Lautenbaugh's situation.
120. NEB. REV. STAT. § 19-3052 (1) (2002).
121. NEB. REV. STAT. § 19-3052 (2).
122. Id.
123. NEB. REV. STAT. § 19-3052 (3)-(4).
124. NEB. REv. STAT. § 19-3052 (5)(c).
125. 198 Neb. 19, 251 N.W.2d 662. See supra subsection III.A.2.
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However, while the language of section 19-3052 does provide gui-
dance on the specific issue of whether it is appropriate to redistrict a
city following annexations, it cannot provide an adequate basis for the
scope of the decision in Chambers. Section 19-3052 specifically pro-
vides for redistricting following annexations of territory to cities. Yet,
the decision in Chambers is not limited only to situations involving
annexations. While Lautenbaugh argued it was annexations to
Omaha that had prompted him to redraw the city's districts (in which
case section 19-3052 by analogy could provide useful guidance), the
Nebraska Supreme Court's decision focuses on the broader issue of
maintaining substantial population equality, with no stated limita-
tions or guidelines as to necessary occurrences that would prompt
redistricting.
[T]here is no language in § 32-553 which prohibits the appropriate legal entity
from redrawing district boundaries at other times to maintain substantial
equality. We thus determine that § 32-553 does not limit redrawing of district
boundaries to only once every 10 years. 1 2 6
By framing the issue as "whether § 32-553 limits the Omaha City
Council or other appropriate legal entities to redrawing district
boundaries only once every 10 years,"'12 7 the court's holding goes well
beyond any guidance available in section 19-3052 and opens the door
to public officials redistricting whenever it appears districts are sub-
stantially unequal in population.
G. Potential Results: Ohio's Experience
Even where statutory language unambiguously provides for redis-
tricting of political subdivisions more frequently than once every ten
years, courts have been concerned about the potential for abuse. For
example, Ohio's statute addressing the division of municipal corpora-
tions into wards, section 731.06 Ohio Rev. Code Ann., provides unam-
biguously that "[iin order to provide substantially equal population in
each of the wards, the legislative authority may redivide the city into
wards at any time,"1 28 an authority the Nebraska Supreme Court has
arguably granted through Chambers to Nebraska's political subdivi-
sions. Such wide discretion in redistricting, however, has the poten-
tial to cause problems. In Huenergardt v. Canton,129 the Ohio Court
of Appeals had to play referee between two competing redistricting
plans, one proposed by the Director of Public Service and one proposed
by the Canton City Council. Upon failure of the Canton City Council
to redistrict the city in 1981, the task statutorily fell to the Director of
Public Service, who complied and submitted a plan to the County
126. 263 Neb. at 931, 644 N.W.2d at 550.
127. Id. at 927, 644 N.W.2d at 547.
128. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 731.06 (2002).
129. 1983 Ohio App. LEXIS 13094 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983).
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
Board of Elections. Later, the city council tried again, and this time
passed a redistricting plan. The question then became which plan
should prevail. The court held the language of the statute to be "clear
and unequivocal"13o that the council could redistrict the city at any
time in order to maintain population equality. The court recognized it
could be setting an unwanted precedent, but held it was not proper for
it to consider any political ramifications:
We recognize that the plain language of sub-section (C) could allow repetitive,
wasteful, and chaotic periodic redistricting, at the whim of a city council.
That may be the result here. But, as we have noted above, such result is not
within the appropriate area of judicial review of legislative prerogative. 131
Where the Ohio Court of Appeals reluctantly had to give effect to an
unambiguous grant of statutory power, the result of which allows for
"chaotic periodic redistricting," the Nebraska Supreme Court deter-
mined the language of Nebraska's section 32-553 to essentially mean
the same thing where it may have been unnecessary to do so. The
practical consequences could be at least the opportunity for similar
repetitive, chaotic, or even politically abusive redistricting in
Nebraska.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
The Nebraska Supreme Court did not have to assign to section 32-
553 a meaning as broad as that which the court gave it, and given a
number of reasons a better outcome likely would have been to give the
statute a narrower interpretation. Given its holding in Chambers, the
court has instructed public officials across Nebraska responsible for
redistricting that they may do so whenever it is necessary to maintain
substantial population equality. A narrower interpretation would
have been just as plausible given the language of the statutes
involved.
Nebraska Revised Statutes section 14-201.03 read, at the time
Chambers and Lautenbaugh went to court, "The election commission
shall redraw the boundaries of [districts of cities of the metropolitan
class], maintaining the compact and contiguous nature of each, when
such districts are no longer substantially equal in population pursuant
to section 32-553."132 Nebraska Revised Statutes section 32-553 pro-
vides that any political subdivision which elects its governing board by
districts shall have districts that are
substantially equal in population as determined by the most recent federal
decennial census ... Any such political subdivision ... shall, if necessary to
maintain substantial population equality as required by this subsection, have
new district boundaries drawn within six months after the passage and ap-
130. Id. at *16.
131. Id. at *18.
132. NEB. REV. STAT. § 14-201.03 (emphasis supplied).
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proval of the legislative bill providing for reestablishing legislative
districts.1 3
3
Undoubtedly the plain meaning of section 14-201.03 is to grant public
officials the authority and responsibility to make sure electoral dis-
tricts maintain substantial population equality; the clause "pursuant
to 32-553" qualifies that authority, albeit in an ambiguous manner
given the double-meaning that could be applied to the "plain lan-
guage" of section 32-553. That is, given nothing more than the statu-
tory language of section 32-553, it is plausible that the statute could
be interpreted as either (1) setting a floor that redistricting be done at
least within a six month time-frame after the Legislature redistricts
itself, in addition to any other redistricting necessary to maintain
population equality, or (2) setting a ceiling that redistricting be done
only within a six month time-frame after the Legislature redistricts
itself. Yet, given the context within which the statute operates and
weighing the interests of one-person, one-vote against the interests of
stability and continuity in the electoral process, particularly when an
election is pending, the court, for important policy reasons, should
have interpreted section 32-553 narrowly to maintain decennial
reapportionment.
Frequent redistricting, although employed in pursuit of the admi-
rable goal of substantial population equality, may cause undue voter
confusion. If districts change frequently, voters, particularly those
near the changing boundaries, may find themselves in different dis-
tricts from one election to the next. A stable district system serves to
provide people with a connection to other voters similarly situated. It
also provides a stable connection to a representative for whom people
have voted and have come to know as "their" representative. It also
provides stability for representatives who know their constituents and
their concerns and expectations. In the end, frequent redistricting
that minimizes such advantages of stability may lead to voter disillu-
sionment and frustration, reducing political participation. The prob-
lem may become particularly acute when redistricting is attempted
just before an election, causing unnecessary confusion and upheaval.
Another concern is the potential for political manipulation. Redis-
tricting is an inherently political process that can be used to control
the political composition of a governing board. If the frequency of re-
districting is not restricted, it may be tempting for an official or gov-
erning board to redraw districts as needed to maintain or gain a
partisan advantage. It is understood that partisan politics plays a
major role in even decennial reapportionment. But where it is limited
to once every ten years, the process is more fundamentally tied to
changes in population based on the federal census.
133. NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-553 (2000) (emphasis supplied).
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[Tihe federal census is generally viewed as being a highly reliable source of
information concerning population. The federal census is conducted by the
Bureau of the Census, whose primary concern is the accurate ascertainment
of data. It is not influenced or swayed by local politics, prejudices, or notions
concerning size and prosperity.134
Where redistricting is allowed more often, an argument could per-
haps always be made that district populations have changed substan-
tially, necessitating a redrawing which would allow adjustments that
could change the political balance of a governing board or allow minor
adjustments to ensure incumbents remain. Thus, redistricting may
become as important as voting in determining the composition of a
governing board.
For a number of reasons, the legal context of section 32-553 sug-
gests it should have been interpreted as limiting reapportionment to
once every ten years. That context includes other jurisdictions' prece-
dence, the United States Supreme Court's landmark decision in Reyn-
olds v Sims, and Nebraska constitutional considerations.
First, the United States Supreme Court's decision in Reynolds v
Sims135 sets a constitutionally-permissible minimum of reapportion-
ment at once every ten years, and while it says more frequent reappor-
tionment is not precluded and may even be desirable, considerations
of stability and continuity in the electoral system, particularly where
an election is up-coming, may advise against it. The Court explicitly
acknowledged that near the end of a ten-year census period, electoral
districts will inevitably have become unequal in population, but such
is not a valid reason, independent of others, for redistricting just
before a new census or, particularly, an election.
Second, courts in other jurisdictions and federal appeals courts de-
ciding reapportionment cases where the closeness of an election to a
census has made the timing of redistricting an issue have held that
the interests of one-person, one vote should usually yield to interests
of predictable reapportionment and election stability. Courts have
generally recognized it is inevitable that near the end of a ten-year
census cycle, districts will become malapportioned. Yet, more fre-
quent redistricting in pursuit of the one-person, one-vote principle is
not prescribed so long as the state has a rational reapportionment
plan. In fact, courts have held that where a state has a rational policy
for doing so, reapportionment may even be delayed beyond the usual
ten-year cycle.
Third, where courts have required more frequent redistricting, it is
usually in response to previous discriminatory practices in drawing
districts or where a state has not shown a rational policy reason for
delaying redistricting beyond a federal census.
134. Pelzer v. Bellevue, 198 Neb. 19, 25, 251 N.W.2d 662, 665-66 (1977).
135. 377 U.S. 533 (1963).
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Fourth, Article III, section 5 of the Nebraska Constitution provides
that the Legislature is to redistrict the state following each federal
decennial census. In prescribing the frequency of legislative redis-
tricting, this constitutional provision also provides important context
useful in determining questions of frequency in redistricting political
subdivisions, which section 32-553 ties to the time-frame within which
the Legislature is redistricted. The history of Article III, section 5
shows it used to include additional language affirmatively precluding
the state from redistricting more often than once every ten years.
Though that language has been removed through amendment, the in-
tent may remain. Committee and floor debate on that amendment
shows only that the wording was likely removed to avoid a potential
redistricting problem in 1971 as the Legislature grappled with trying
to implement a constitutionally acceptable redistricting plan in 1965.
Additionally, the South Dakota Supreme Court recently interpreted a
very similar section of their constitution, where almost identical limit-
ing language had also been removed through amendment. That court,
however, held that the absence of the language made no difference,
and that "even without the express prohibition, the affirmative man-
date for legislative action precludes action at any other time."1 36
Finally, where Nebraska statutes do provide specifically for more
frequent redistricting of cities, it is limited to situations where there
have been annexations. The court's holding in Chambers makes no
such limitation, and instead is directed to "public officials" who will
likely face redistricting questions prior to 2010. In Ohio, where a stat-
ute does unambiguously give governing boards authority to redistrict
at any time, the Ohio Court of Appeals has held such could lead to
"repetitive, wasteful, and chaotic periodic redistricting, at the whim of
a city council."137 The potential for similar abuse of the frequency of
the redistricting process, be it by elected officials or constituencies
forcing frequent redistricting for political gain, now may exist in Ne-
braska after Chambers.
V. CONCLUSION
Resolution of the question, "Is redistricting in Nebraska limited to
once every ten years?" in Chambers could plausibly have been an-
swered either way given the language of Nebraska Revised Statutes
section 32-553. In focusing on the plain language of the statute as
opposed to its ambiguity, the court missed the opportunity to examine
the broader practical context in which the statute operates and, conse-
quently, perhaps a more preferred answer in light of the policy rea-
sons. The result is that election commissioners and public officials
136. 615 N.W.2d at 595-96.
137. 1983 Ohio App. LEXIS 13094 at *18.
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around the state must now understand they have been given at the
same time broader power to shape the politics of their political subdi-
visions and heightened responsibility to ensure that electoral districts
are substantially equal in population. Lautenbaugh faced two law-
suits, one attempting to force him to redistrict, one attempting to en-
join him from doing so. The lawsuit attempting to enjoin redistricting
failed, and at the same time public officials were handed greater re-
sponsibility for maintaining population equality. Could this provide
grounds for future lawsuits to force officials to redistrict more fre-
quently so that substantial population equality is maintained? What
would constitute substantial equality? These are questions Chambers
did not answer, but perhaps raised. What is certain is that election
commissioners and public officials can no longer assume that decen-
nial reapportionment is sufficient to maintain substantial population
equality of electoral districts, and may need to reassess their redis-
tricting plans to meet that goal.
